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Abstract
Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid bud-
get to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the
Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact diﬀers
across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not
committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid
is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the
case for donors too concerned with eﬃciency ex post. They therefore del-
egate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more
sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
JEL-codes: F35, O11
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1 Introduction
Donor countries distribute foreign aid to recipient countries in two main ways:
directly or indirectly through intermediaries such as NGOs and the World Bank.
Table 1 demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the importance of
intermediaries in the allocation of aid among the members of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Subtracting contributions to NGOs
from the bilateral share of oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) and adding it
to the multilateral one, one arrives at a rough division of disbursements in terms
of whether the responsibility for allocating the funds is delegated or not.1 It
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1Woods (2000) claims that OECD statistics underestimate the role played by NGOs. The
underestimation is due to the financing of service provision by NGOs at the request of bi-
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may be seen that in terms of the share of total disbursements, intermediaries
controlled approximately 35% of the total, which was about 52.3 billion USD.
[Table 1 about here]
These figures demonstrate the importance of delegation in the distribution
of foreign aid. How may we explain the patterns displayed in table 1? Most
theoretical analyses of foreign aid consider a generic donor, with delegation
not being an issue.2 There are of course many possible reasons for delegating
the responsibility for aid allocation to agents. I will focus on strategic incen-
tives for delegation: as in various other contexts, delegating policy to an agent
may reduce problems of dynamic inconsistency. Altruistic bilateral donors face
a Samaritan’s Dilemma due to the strategic adaptation of recipient country
governments expecting donors to rush in to satisfy any needs left unfulfilled.3
Delegation may help alleviate the consequences of such behaviour.
Svensson (2000a) finds that choosing an agent that is less inequality-oriented
than themselves results in better outcomes from the perspective of bilateral
donors. However, the figures in table 1 cast doubts over the explanatory power
of his model. It is well-known from studies of aid allocation that on average
bilateral aid is more driven by donor interests than recipient needs, with the
latter concerns more strongly present in the funding decisions of multilateral
agencies.4 This is because strategic and commercial interests loom large in
the calculations of countries such as France, Japan, and the US. On the other
hand, some small bilateral donors - in particular, the Scandinavian countries
and the Netherlands - tend to concentrate their economic assistance on the
poorest developing countries. Hence, they may be characterised as fairly averse
to inequality among recipients. Based on Svensson (2000a), we would expect
these donors to benefit from delegating policy to a multilateral agency such as
the World Bank. Many of the the Bank’s most influential member countries
lateral aid agencies as well as the distribution of emergency aid through NGOs not being
recorded as aid disbursed to NGOs. However, in order to analyse strategic delegation, which
is the objective of this paper, the oﬃcial figures are the right ones since the allocation of the
categories of funds omitted is not at the discretion of the NGOs. As OECD statistics exclude
bilateral transfers to the multilaterals for purposes predetermined by the former actors, the
same argument applies to the numbers shown for multilateral aid.
2 See e.g. Hagen (2000), Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2003), Pedersen (1996, 2001), and
Svensson (2000a,b). A partial exception is Torsvik (2003), who studies whether two donors
would benefit from cooperating. Azam and Laﬀont (2003) look at the role played by local
NGOs in a developing country when a donor and the government engage in poverty alleviation,
but only in their capacity as potential agents of the latter.
3The Samaritan’s Dilemma was first laid out by Buchanan (1975), who considers it a major
problem in modern welfare states. Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) provide a formal and general
analysis, noting in their conclusion that the relationship between aid donors and recipients
might be studied within this framework. For actual applications of the Samaritan’s Dilemma
to foreign aid, see Pedersen (1996, 2001) and Svensson (2000a). Strictly speaking, altruism
is only involved if the aid budget is endogenous (as in Pedersen 1996). However, similar
dilemmas arise when donors care about several recipients and are to some extent concerned
with distributional issues (as in Pedersen 2001, Svensson 2000a, and here).
4A non-exhaustive list of studies on this issue include Alesina and Dollar (2000), Boone
(1996), Boschini and Olofsgård (2003), Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1997), Chauvet (2002),
Maizels and Nissanke (1984), and Rodrik (1995).
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have other concerns higher on their agenda, making it likely that the allocation
of its funds is less poverty-oriented than the one that these countries would
have chosen had they distributed the money themselves. But why would the
US leave more than a quarter of its ODA in the care of multilateral agencies
in which it has considerable less leeway to pursue its commercial and strategic
interests, i.e., delegate responsibility for a substantial chunk of its aid budget
to agents that must be judged more averse to inequality among recipients than
itself? Put simply: Svensson (2000a) cannot explain why both the Nordics and
the US delegate to the World Bank.
In this paper, I analyse a model that shares the essential feature of the
one studied by Svensson (2000a), namely, that there are two recipient countries
locked in a competition for aid that weakens their incentives to improve their
own lot as this results in a reduction in aid. The only important change is that
the productivity of aid is allowed to vary between recipient countries. I show
that it is then not always the case that donors will choose an agent that is less
concerned with relative poverty than themselves. In fact, for some donors the
opposite is true. The reason is that ex post, the allocation of aid by such donors
tends to favour the recipient country where the productivity of aid is high.
However, this leads to a very low level of investment in the low-productivity
recipient, where other things being equal investment is most valuable ex ante
due to the large amount of aid that would be required to generate an equiva-
lent increase in consumption. Therefore, it is optimal for donor types not too
concerned about inequality to pick an agent that favours such countries more
strongly than what is implied by their own ex post allocation rule, i.e., an agent
that seeks to smooth consumption across recipients to a greater extent than
such donors would if they were in charge of executing policy.
The model is outlined in the next section, where the optimal aid allocation
under commitment and the resulting investment in the recipient countries are
presented as well. In section 3, corresponding results are derived for the case
where the donor operates under discretion, i.e., allocates its aid budget after
the recipients have made their investments. The delegation decision is analysed
in section 4. Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2 The Model and a Benchmark
Consider the following three variants of a three-stage game, illustrated in table
2. If a donor can commit to a distribution of its budget between two recipients
before they act, the timing is as follows. In stage 1, the donor decides on its
optimal policy. Fully aware of this policy, the recipients then choose a level
of investment. In the final stage, the aid policy is executed. The equilibrium
outcome in this regime, denoted by P , serves as a benchmark for evaluating
the equilibrium of the second and more realistic case, when the donor cannot
precommit its policy. It then chooses the allocation of its budget in stage 3. In
stage 2 of regime D, the recipients simultaneously choose how much to invest,
taking into account both the direct returns to investment and the indirect ef-
3
fects that investment has on consumption in stage 3 through its impact on the
allocation of aid. In the delegation regime (A), the donor may delegate aid pol-
icy to a hand-picked agent prior to the recipients making their decisions. This
means that the responsibility for allocating the donor’s budget at stage 3 is left
to the agent. In all other respects, this case is identical to the discretionary
regime without delegation.
[Table 2 about here]
The donor’s preferences over the stage 3 consumption in recipient countries
L and H are
WD =
X
j
UD (Cj) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P
j
(Cj)
1−ηD
1−ηD
, 0 < ηD <∞, ηD 6= 1;P
j
lnCj , ηD = 1.
(1)
ηD = −
CjUcc
Uc
is the elasticity of marginal utility. It is also a measure of the
degree to which the donor is concerned with the distribution of consumption
between the two recipients. The higher ηD is, the stronger is the inclination
to smooth diﬀerences in consumption levels, other things being equal. I will
speak of this parameter as the donor’s degree of inequality-aversion. The issue
at stake is whether a donor operating under discretion will find it in its interest
to delegate aid policy to an agent with a mandate diﬀerent from the preferences
of the donor, i.e., setting ηA 6= ηD.5
The donor seeks to maximise this objective function subject to the following
resource constraints
BL +BH ≤ B; (2a)
Cj = Yj + γjBj . (2b)
(2a) just states that transfers to the two recipients cannot exceed the total
aid budget, which is constant. (2b) expresses the consumption of each recipient
as the sum of income generated domestically, Yj , and aid times the productivity
of aid, γj . Assuming that the productivity of aid, which is the marginal impact
of aid on consumption, might vary between the two recipients is the most impor-
tant diﬀerence between the model analysed here and that of Svensson (2000a).
A number of factors might give rise to variations in aid impact. For example,
corruption might be more widespread in one recipient than the other or the
eﬃciency of public spending might be lower due to lower levels of bureaucratic
capacity. Thus, it seems a reasonable assumption to make.
In stage 2 of the game, recipients choose investment in order to maximise
V (E − Ij) +
¡
Yj + γjBj
¢
. (3)
5This is the same type of objective function that Svensson (2000a) uses to analyse this
issue. The fact that ηD is constant of course simplifies the analysis and in the current context
using this objective function has the added benefit of facilitating comparison with his results.
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That is, investment is financed from an endowment of E and generates a
stage 3 domestic income of Yj = f (Ij), with f (Ij) being strictly increasing
and concave. Whereas stage 2 consumption is valued according to a strictly
increasing and strictly concave function V (·), stage 3 consumption enters the
recipients’ objective functions linearly. As the perceptive reader will have no-
ticed, I assume that the donor does not to care about the resources recipients
spend in stage 2 (E − Ij). One way to interpret this assumption is that the
donor sees the amount not invested as wasted, perhaps because it is consumed
by the elite of the recipient countries. Pedersen (1996) uses a similar assumption
in his analysis of aid and investment, his interpretation being that the donor is
only concerned with growth. It does not aﬀect the results derived below as the
objective functions of the donor and recipient governments also diﬀer in Svens-
son (2000a). In any case, with two (or more) recipients divergence between the
preferences of the donor and recipients seems realistic as one would not expect
one recipient country to care about consumption in the other, at least not to
the same extent as a rich donor.
The assumption that recipients are risk-neutral is chosen because it has two
convenient implications. Firstly, it generates a clear-cut benchmark against
which the discretionary equilibria with and without delegation may be evalu-
ated. As I demonstrate shortly, the outcome is that in the commitment regime
there is no reduction in investment from receiving aid. Other specifications of
the objective-function will generate crowding-out of investment by aid in the
commitment case too, but as long as aid is given to supplement domestic in-
comes it will always be the case that investment is lower in the discretionary
equilibrium. As will become apparent, the formulation chosen illustrates this in
a very clear manner. The second benefit from assuming linearity in Cj is that
investment levels in the two recipient countries are not interdependent in the
discretionary regime. This result is demonstrated in section 3.
When recipients make their choice after the donor has committed to some
allocation
©
BPL , B
P
H
ª
, it is readily apparent that their decision is unaﬀected by
the distribution of aid. This is confirmed by the first-order condition for optimal
investment, which in this case is
−V 0 (E − Ij) + f 0 (Ij) = 0. (4)
The solution entails the same level of investment in both countries: IPL =
IPH ≡ IP . The level of income generated domestically is therefore also identical
and independent of the aid allocation.
When the donor makes its choice in stage 1, it is fully aware that its donations
do not aﬀect recipient country investment. Inserting the constraints (2a− b)
into the objective function and taking the derivative with respect to BL yields
the following first-order condition for an optimal aid allocation:6
∂WD
∂BL
= (CL)
−ηD γL − (CH)
−ηD γH = 0. (5)
6 In the main text, I concentrate on the case ηD 6= 1. The proofs of all propositions and
lemmas are in the appendix.
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In interpreting this condition as well as the results that follow, it turns out
to be useful to define the income levels of the recipients in aid-equivalents, i.e.,
make them commensurable with each other by expressing them in the same
units as B. This can be done by dividing domestic income by the productivity
of aid: yj =
Yj
γj
. Then we may write the total amount of resources available in
stage 3 as R = B + yL + yH .
Using these definitions, Proposition 1 follows straightforwardly from (5):
Proposition 1
a) If γL = γH , the optimal ex ante aid allocation is not a function of ηD:
BPL = B
P
H =
1
2B.
b) If γL 6= γH , the optimal ex ante aid allocation is BPj = ΠPj RP − yPj ,
where ΠPj ∈ (0, 1) is the optimal aid-equivalent consumption share of j.
Part a) of the proposition states that if aid impact is the same in the two
recipient countries, the degree of aversion to relative poverty does not matter
for the optimal split of the aid budget. The donor would then always want to
equalise consumption levels, i.e., have CL = CH . Since the recipients invest the
same amount in equilibrium and thus have identical incomes, this in turn means
that they should divide the aid budget evenly. This is the reason why Svensson
(2000a) needs the twin assumptions that recipient countries might be diﬀerent ex
post due to exogenous shocks and that the returns to aid are strictly decreasing.7
Otherwise, both would receive half the aid budget regardless of the inequality-
aversion of the agency in charge of allocation and so delegation would not change
anything. As I assume ex ante asymmetry from now on, ex post asymmetry
does not add anything but notational complexity. I therefore disregard the
possibility of recipients being hit by shocks. Moreover, while decreasing returns
is probably a more realistic assumption than constant marginal eﬀects of aid the
gain in analytical simplicity when introducing variations in aid impact seems
large enough for the latter assumption to be warranted.
Assuming γL < γH , aid is more productive in terms of generating consump-
tion in recipient country H. Part b) of the proposition then informs us that
the optimal allocation depends on the degree of inequality aversion through
ΠPj =
BPj +y
P
j
RP . Using (2b), Π
P
j =
CPj /γj
RP , i.e., it is the consumption share of j
measured in aid-equivalents. The optimal value of ΠPj is a function of ηD:
ΠPj =
¡
γj
¢ 1−ηD
ηD
(γL)
1−ηD
ηD + (γH)
1−ηD
ηD
(6)
Obviously, ΠPH = 1−ΠPL , so that in the following we need only look at the
share going to L. L is disadvantaged by the fact that aid has a smaller impact
on consumption there compared to H. If the donor cared only about eﬃciency
(ηD = 0), H would get all the aid;
8 and only if the donor was infinitely averse to
7 Income is exogenous but stochastic in Svensson (2000a), with the recipients exerting
“eﬀort” that increases the probability of being in a state where income is high.
8Actually, the result is stronger than this; if ηD = 0, the donor would like to set CL = 0.
But the donor cannot reduce CL below YL without being able to tax L, which is unrealistic.
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inequality would it equalise consumption in L and H when γL < γH . However,
the higher the value of ηD, the greater the willingness of the donor to sacrifice
some of the overall power of aid in raising the combined consumption levels in
the recipient countries to have a more equal distribution of consumption between
them. In other words, ΠPL is increasing in ηD. Moreover, Π
P
L R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1.9
For ease of reference, I state these observations as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1
a) ∂Π
P
L
∂ηD
> 0;
b) ΠPL R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1.
c) LimηD→0Π
P
L = 0 and LimηD→∞Π
P
L =
γH
γL+γH
> 12 .
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
3 Optimal Aid Policy under Discretion
We now turn to the case where the donor cannot precommit its aid policy. It is
then chosen at stage 3 of the game, after investment levels have been determined
by the two recipients. Since the constraints are of the same form as in the
precommitment case, it should be clear that the first-order condition for an
optimal ex post distribution of B looks exactly the same as that for the ex ante
distribution. The only diﬀerence is that it will be evaluated at diﬀerent levels of
domestic incomes in these countries, as recipients now are able to incorporate
the eﬀect of their investment on the distribution of aid. That is, we will have
RD 6= RP . Hence, we have Proposition 2
Proposition 2
The optimal ex post aid allocation is BDj = Π
D
j R
D − yDj .
It is important to note that the share of total available resources in terms of
aid equivalents consumed by each recipient is the same as in the precommitment
case: ΠDj = Π
P
j ≡ Π∗j . However, the eﬀects of this allocation rule is now
radically diﬀerent. In essence, the recipients see the donor as “confiscating”
their domestic incomes and returning a fraction of their combined incomes plus
the aid budget. The optimal levels of consumption are
CDj = Yj + γjB
D
j = γjΠ
∗
jR
D. (7)
Hence,
Thus, there is a lower bound on ΠPL that needs to be satisfied in order to have an interior
solution. BPL ≥ 0⇔ ΠPL ≥
yPL
RP
, i.e., the optimal consumption share must be at least as large
as the share of available resources generated by L. Since I assume ηD > 0, Π
P
L > 0 ∀ηD .
Hence, for a large enough value of B this condition is always satisfied.
9As may be deduced directly from (5), C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD . Thus, for any ηD ∈ (0,∞) H
has the highest level of consumption. However, this is not necessarily the case in terms of aid
equivalents: C
P
H/γH
CPL /γL
=
1−ΠPL
ΠPL
. If ηD > 1 Π
P
L > 0.5, and so this ratio is less than one.
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∂CDj
∂Yj
= 1 + γj
∂BDj
∂Yj
= Π∗j < 1. (8)
That is, since
∂BDj
∂Yj
= 1γj
¡
Π∗j − 1
¢
< 0, recipients see themselves as collecting
only a fraction of the stage 3 returns to investment. As long as Π∗L 6= 12 , which
is the case for ηD 6= 1, L and H experience diﬀerent aid-adjusted returns to
investment and will therefore invest diﬀerent amounts even though they are
identical in all respects save the productivity of aid. The first-order condition
for optimal investment is now
−V 0 (E − Ij) +Π∗jf 0
¡
IDj
¢
= 0. (9)
Because Π∗j < 1, I
D
j < I
P . Thus, there is underinvestment in both coun-
tries compared to the precommitment case. It follows that the donor is worse
oﬀ: the relative distribution of consumption is the same, but the amount of
resources available is lower (RD < RP ). This is the version of the Samari-
tan’s Dilemma it is facing here: its eﬀort to increase consumption in the re-
cipient countries ex post undermines their own eﬀorts. Each recipient is in
eﬀect taxed at a rate 1 − Π∗j through the aid allocation mechanism, a portion
of the increase in domestic income generated by investment being transferred
to the other recipient. Conscious of this, recipients reduce their investment,
the result being that the amount of resources available for consumption at
stage 3 is reduced. Naturally, the less they are “taxed”, the more they in-
vest:
dIDj
dΠ∗j
= −
∙
f 0(IDj )
V 00(E−Ij)+Π∗j f 00(IDj )
¸
> 0. However, as a greater share going to
one recipient inevitably means less to the other yD = yDL +y
D
H need not increase.
To derive the properties of yD with respect to Π∗L, I assume that V (·) has a
constant elasticity of marginal utility, µ, and that f (Ij) = κIj . Calculating IDj
is then a straightforward exercise. Moreover, so is proving that yD is a strictly
concave function of Π∗L with a maximum at
bΠ = (γH) µ1+µ
(γL)
µ
1+µ + (γH)
µ
1+µ
∈
µ
1
2
,
γH
γL + γH
¶
(10)
As already noted, aid is less productive in L, but the other side of the coin is
that a unit gain in YL generates a greater increase in yD than a corresponding
gain in YH . This is why bΠ > 12 . At Π∗L = 12 , ∂IDL∂Π∗L = ∂IDH∂Π∗H , but the fact that
investment in L generates more aid-equivalents ceteris paribus means that the
maximum is at ∂I
D
H/∂Π
∗
H
∂IDL /∂Π
∗
L
= γHγL
> 1. In other words, if the goal was to have as
much resources as possible for distribution in stage 3, it would be desirable to
have more investment in L than in H.
The change in y caused by changing ΠL is the eﬃciency-eﬀect from shifting
responsibility to an agent with diﬀerent distributional preferences. In the next
section I show that this determines the kind of agent the donor would like to
delegate to. I therefore summarise these important results in Proposition 3:
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Proposition 3
yD is a strictly concave function of Π∗L with a unique maximum at bΠ.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the sum of domestic incomes in
the recipient countries in the discretionary regime and the consumption share
of the low-productivity country in terms of aid-equivalents.
[Figure 2 about here]
From this proposition and Lemma 1, the following useful result follows:
Lemma 2
∃bη > 1 such that Π∗L = bΠ.
That is, since bΠ > 12 and Π∗L is a strictly increasing function of ηD with a
value equal to 0.5 for ηD = 1, it must be the case that there is a donor type bη > 1
that has preferences such that its optimal ex post distribution rule maximises
the combined domestic incomes of the recipients.
We are now in a position to investigate whether the donor at stage 1 would
like to leave the responsibility for allocating B in stage 3 to an agent with
preferences diﬀerent from its own.
4 The Delegation Decision
In stage 1 of the game, the donor makes the delegation decision. That is, it
decides whether to relieve itself of the task of executing aid policy in stage 3
by delegating the responsibility to an agent, and if so, what type of agent it
would like to pick. The choice will be made knowing that the agent will be
free to pursue an aid policy that satisfies its preferences. The solution will be
an allocation of aid of the form shown in Propositions 1 and 2, with only the
share of total available resources going to L being diﬀerent. Since this share is
monotonically increasing in η, deciding on the optimal mandate for an agent,
ηA∗, can be reduced to picking Π
A
L . Therefore, the donor’s problem is
MaxΠAL WD =
¡
γLΠ
A
LR
A
¢1−ηD
1− ηD
+
¡
γH
¡
1−ΠAL
¢
RA
¢1−ηD
1− ηD
, (11)
taking into account the fact that yA is a function of ΠAL through the eﬀect
it has on investment in stage 2.
The first-order condition for a maximum is
∂WD
∂ΠAL
=
¡
CAL
¢−ηD dCAL
dΠAL
+
¡
CAH
¢−ηD dCAH
dΠAL
= 0 (12)
⇔
∙
RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
¸
+
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA
∙¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL
−RA
¸
= 0.
Here I have made use of the fact that in stage 3, C
A
L
CAH
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1
ηA . Note as
well that changing ΠAL has both a distributional eﬀect and an eﬀect on total
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available resources in stage 3. An increase in ΠAL obviously entails a gain for
L, while H loses RA at the margin. Whether the eﬃciency-eﬀect is positive or
negative depends on the sign of ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
.
The first-order condition may be rewritten as
µ
ηD − ηA
ηA
¶
ln
µ
γL
γH
¶
= ln
⎡
⎣
RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
RA −
¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL
⎤
⎦ , (13)
which implicitly defines ηA∗. To interpret this condition, first recall that
Lemma 2 informs us that there is a donor type bη for which Π∗L = bΠ. If such a
donor evaluates the benefits from delegating to an agent with a diﬀerent degree
of inequality-aversion, it will note that at ηA = ηD, Π
A
L =
bΠ. At this point
∂yA
∂ΠAL
= 0, and so the right-hand side of (13) is zero. But at ηA = ηD = bη
the left-hand side is also zero. Thus, this donor type sees no need to delegate.
The intuition is that in order to benefit from delegation, the negative incentive
eﬀects of aid must be reduced. However, given that the agent will be operating
under discretion, one can do no better than maximising yA. Since this is the
case when L is given a consumption share in terms of aid-equivalents of bΠ, a
donor with these preferences has nothing to gain from delegation.
For donor types less concerned with relative poverty than this, starting at
their true preferences it will be the case that ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
> 0. This means that the
expression in square brackets on the right-hand side of (13) is greater than 1,
and so its logarithm is positive. Since γL < γH , the sign of the left-hand side
is the negative of the sign of ηD−ηAηA . Therefore, ηD < ηA∗. In other words,
the optimal agent is more concerned with relative poverty than the donor, not
less. The reason is that these donor types are “too concerned” about eﬃciency
ex post, favouring H to an extent that makes it ex ante optimal to increase
investment in L at the expense of investment inH by committing to a ΠAL > Π
∗
L.
This is the exact opposite of the result derived by Svensson (2000a). In
the current context, his result only obtains if ηD > bη. Such donors are “too
inequality-averse” in the sense that it is possible to obtain a better distribution
of investment eﬀort between the recipients by delegating to an agent with a
mandate that puts less emphasis on smoothing consumption diﬀerentials. As
the distortion of the distribution of consumption is negligible starting from
ηA = ηD whereas the eﬃciency gain is of the first-order, it is optimal to for
them to tie their hands by giving a more “conservative” agent the responsibility
for allocating their budgets ex post.
The second-order condition, which is examined in the appendix, confirms
that we have found diﬀerent maxima. Proposition 4 is therefore established:
Proposition 4
a) When ηD = bη, there are no benefits from strategically delegating aid
policy to an agent with preferences diﬀerent from the donor.
b) When ηD 6= bη, the donor will benefit from delegation. If ηD > bη (ηD < bη)
the optimal agent is less (more) concerned with inequality than the donor.
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The intuition behind this proposition is that there is no point in delegating
responsibility unless there is an eﬃciency gain. In and of itself, the ex post
distribution is optimal for a donor given its preferences. The problem is that
discretionary allocation of aid generates negative incentive eﬀects resulting in
lower levels of investment than under commitment. Moreover, when ηD 6= bη the
total domestic income of the recipients is not even maximised given the fact that
aid is distributed ex post. Thus, changing the allocation rule can have positive
eﬀects. The type of agentchosen is determined by whether more redistribution
towards L increases or reduces the amount of resources available in stage 3.
Figure 2 illustrates that this depends on whether ηD Q bη.10
A final point to note is that delegation cannot achieve the commitment
outcome. This is due to the fact that if competition for aid is not eliminated,
negative incentive eﬀects remain. And as long as the agent is operating under
discretion, recipients take into account that their stage 3 consumption levels are
interdependent due to the aid allocation mechanism. Hence, investment levels
will be below those attained in the commitment regime for both recipients. It
follows that donors are still worse oﬀ compared to what they could achieve
with the ex ante optimal policy. A donor of type bη cannot improve on WDD ,
the level of its objective function attained in the discretionary regime without
delegation. As noted in section 3, this is clearly lower than WPD ; while the
relative distribution of consumption is the same in the two regimes, yD < yP
and so CDL + C
D
H < C
P
L + C
P
H . Donor types for which ηD 6= bη can improve on
WDD through strategic delegation, but still cannot reach W
P
D . L’s share of total
consumption measured in aid-equivalents is not equal to Π∗L and y
A < yP .
5 Conclusions and Extensions
It is known from analyses of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the context of aid
that the intervention of an altruistic donor might have counterproductive eﬀects
due to strategic recipient behaviour. Svensson (2000a) has suggested that the
problem might be alleviated by delegating aid policy to an agent that is less
inequality-averse than the donor. This result is intuitive, and, moreover, in
line with other delegation results in political economy, e.g. the benefits from
delegating monetary policy to a central bank that cares relatively less about
unemployment and more about inflation than society does. I show that the
result of Svensson (2000a) does not always apply when aid eﬀectiveness varies
across recipients. Some donor types would then like to delegate aid policy
to an agent that is more averse to relative poverty than themselves because
10 It might be argued that the same factors that make for low aid eﬀectiveness also reduces
the eﬀectiveness of domestic investment. It can be shown that this would not aﬀect the
results derived here. If κH > κL, it is still the case that y is a strictly concave function of
ΠL. Moreover, whether bΠ increases or decreases compared to the case κH = κL depends on
µ. The reason is that a higher marginal product of investment in H compared to L has two
conflicting eﬀects. On the one hand, it makes it desirable to shift investment from L to H,
but on the other hand the marginal responsiveness of investment in H to changes in ΠH goes
down. The net eﬀect on bΠ is thus not clear.
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they are too concerned with eﬃciency ex post, making it possible to shift the
consumption possibility frontier of the recipients outwards by strengthening the
incentives for investment in the country where the productivity of aid is low.
The diﬀerences in results derive from the fact that whereas I assume that
recipients are diﬀerent, Svensson (2000a) assumes that they are identical ex-
cept possibly for being hit by diﬀerent exogenous income shocks. In his model,
the negative incentive eﬀects of ex post aid allocation stem from the fact that
in states of the world where recipients are hit by asymmetric shocks, the donor
smooths the consumption diﬀerential, thereby decreasing the incentives for both
recipients to exert “eﬀort” to increase the probability of being in a state where
income is high. Thus, incentives can be improved for both recipients by com-
mitting to being less responsive to consumption diﬀerentials ex post. In my
model, incentives can necessarily only be improved for one of the recipients by
weakening the investment incentives of the other. Since most aid has histori-
cally been given to spur investment and growth, it seems more likely than not
that such incentive trade-oﬀs exists. In fact, aid tends to be procyclical, which
is inconsistent with a story where the negative incentive eﬀects are due to the
countercyclicality of discretionary aid allocation.11 Furthermore, in contrast to
Svensson (2000a) I provide an explanation of why donors at the opposite sides
of the spectrum when it comes to inequality-aversion - e.g. the US and the
Nordics - delegate financial power to an agency such as the World Bank.
There are two interesting extensions that I plan to pursue. Firstly, in re-
ality delegation of aid policy is not completely analogous to, say, delegation of
monetary policy in that the principal is not free to pick an agent. There are po-
tential agents available, NGOs and multilateral agencies, but none of these can
in general be expected to approximate the optimal agent from the viewpoint of
a bilateral donor. In combination with the fact that in practice one can delegate
responsibility for part of the budget, this may result in a combination of dele-
gated and non-delegated aid being optimal, which seems to be what the data
in table 1 really suggests. Secondly, analysing the case where a group of donors
considers delegating to a common agent - a multilateral agency - seems fruitful.
One would then have a starting point for anlysing both the positive and the nor-
mative aspects of bilateral versus multilateral aid, which could have important
implications for how the system of international aid should be organised.
6 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of the propositions and lemmas in the main text.
i) Proof of Proposition 1
Combining the constraints (2a− b) and inserting the result into the objective
function, the maximisation problem concerns one variable only, say, BPL . The
first-order condition for the case where ηD 6= 1 is
11 See Bulírˇ and Hamann (2003) and Pallage and Robe (2001) for evidence on the cyclical
properties of aid. The only notable exception to their findings of procyclicality is food aid,
which is of course given in response to negative shocks, but this is a minor part of total aid.
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∂WD
∂BL
=
¡
CPL
¢−ηD ∂CPL
∂BPL
+
¡
CPH
¢−ηD ∂CPH
∂BPL
= 0. (A1)
As ∂C
P
L
∂BPL
= γL and
∂CPH
∂BPL
= −γH , (5) obtains. Part a) concerns the special
case γL = γH . Then the first-order condition reduces to C
P
L = C
P
H . Since the
two recipients invest the same amount in this regime and thus have the same
levels of domestic income, BPL = B
P
H =
1
2B when the productivity of aid is
identical. The solution to part b) starts from C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD . Using (2a− b)
and the definition of aid-equivalent income and defining ΠPj as shown in (6),
one arrives at the aid allocation functions BPj = Π
P
j R
P − yPj . QED.
ii) Proof of Lemma 1
The lemma is most easily proved by calculating the eﬀect of ηD on Ψ =
ΠPL
1−ΠPL
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1−ηD
ηD , which is increasing in ΠPL . Taking logs, one finds that
1
Ψ
∂Ψ
∂ηD
= − 1
(ηD)
2 ln
³
γL
γH
´
, which is positive since γL < γH . Hence,
∂ΠPL
∂ηD
> 0 and
part a) is proven. As ηD → 1, it may be seen that Ψ→ 1. Accordingly, ΠPL → 12 .
In combination with ∂Π
P
L
∂ηD
> 0, this means that ΠPL R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1, concluding
the proof of part b). The limit of lnΨ as ηD → 0 is −∞, demonstrating
that LimηD→0Ψ = 0 ⇔ LimηD→0ΠPL = 0. A similar exercise shows that
LimηD→∞Π
P
L =
γH
γL+γH
. Hence, ΠPL ∈
³
0, γHγL+γH
´
∀ηD ∈ (0,∞). QED.
iii) Proof of Proposition 2
In the precommitment case, Bj only aﬀects Cj directly because the recipients
see the aid given to them as fixed when they make their investment decisions.
Under discretion, the donor moves after the recipients and so it treats investment
as fixed. The result is that the first-order condition for an optimal aid allocation
is identical to (A1) in all respects except for yL and yL. However, the fact that
domestic incomes are reduced has no eﬀect on the distribution of consumption
desired by the donor. It is still the case that C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD , and so the share
of total available resources consumed by each recipient is the same as in the
precommitment regime. For future reference, denote the common share of L
when the donor allocates aid according to its own preferences by Π∗L. QED.
iv) Proof of proposition 3
With the assumptions on preferences and technology made in the main text,
IDj = E −
¡
κΠ∗j
¢− 1µ . One then arrives at yD = y∗ − κ ∙ (κΠ∗L)− 1µγL + (κΠ∗H)− 1µγH
¸
,
where y∗ =
³
κE
γL
+ κEγH
´
is the level of combined aid-equivalent income attained
by the recipients if they both invest their endowments. Taking the first and
second derivatives of this expression demonstrates that yD is a function that
has a unique global maximum at Π∗L =
(γH)
µ
1+µ
(γL)
µ
1+µ+(γH)
µ
1+µ
≡ bΠ. Since γH > γL,
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bΠ ∈ ³12 , γHγL+γH ´. QED.
v) Proof of Lemma 2
By Lemma 1, ∂Π
∗
L
∂ηD
> 0 and Π∗L R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1. As was just demonstrated,bΠ > 12 . It follows that ∃ηD > 1 such that Π∗L = bΠ. I denote this specific value
of the degree of inequality-aversion by bη. QED.
vi) Proof of Proposition 4
The first line of (12) in the main text contains the derivatives dC
A
L
dΠAL
and dC
A
H
dΠAL
.
From (7) one obtains
dCAL
dΠAL
= γLR
A + γLΠ
A
L
∂RA
∂ΠAL
; (A2a)
dCAH
dΠAL
= −γHRA + γH
¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂RA
∂ΠAL
. (A2b)
Now ∂R
A
∂ΠAL
= ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
since B is constant. Moreover, the agent will allocate aid
so that C
A
L
CAH
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1
ηA . Using this result as well as (A2a− b) to rearrange (12),
it may be simplified into
∙
RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
¸
+
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA
∙¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL
−RA
¸
= 0. (A3)
It follows that at the optimum, the expression in curly brackets must be
zero. This results in (13). The second derivative of WD with respect to ΠAL is
∂2WD
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = −ηD ¡CAL ¢−ηD−1µdCALdΠAL
¶2
− ηD
¡
CAH
¢−ηD−1µdCAH
dΠAL
¶2
(A4)
+
¡
CAL
¢−ηD d2CAL
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 + ¡CAH¢−ηD d2CAH
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2
The first two terms can be seen to be negative. The second-order derivatives
of stage 3 consumption with respect to the share allocated to L are
d2CAL
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = γL
Ã
2
∂yA
∂ΠAL
+ΠAL
∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2
!
; (A5a)
d2CAH
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = γH
Ã¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 − 2 ∂yA∂ΠAL
!
. (A5b)
By definition ηA = bη ⇔ ∂yA∂ΠAL = 0. We know that ∂2yA∂(ΠAL)2 < 0. Thus, for
ηA∗ = ηD = bη the second-order condition for a maximum holds. For ηA∗ 6= ηD,
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∂yA
∂ΠAL
6= 0. Using (A5a− b) the sign of last two terms of (A4) may be seen to be
the same as the sign of
⎡
⎣ΠAL +
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA ¡
1−ΠAL
¢⎤⎦ ∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 + 2 ∂yA∂ΠAL
⎡
⎣1−
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA
⎤
⎦ (A6)
For ηD < ηA∗, the expression in the second square bracket is negative. At
the same time, ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
> 0. When ηD > ηA∗, 1−
³
γL
γH
´ ηD−ηA
ηA > 0 while ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
< 0.
So it is unambiguous that ∂
2WD
∂(ΠAL)
2 < 0. QED.
Notes on the logarithmic case
When ηD = 1, (A1) becomes
1
CPL
γL − 1CPH γH = 0. Then B
P
j =
1
2R
P − yPj .
Of course, it remains true that BPj = B
D
j . At ηA = ηD, where Π
A
L = 0.5 and
∂yA
∂ΠAL
> 0 (c.f. Proposition 3), ∂WD∂ΠAL
=
¡
CAL
¢−1 dCAL
dΠAL
+
¡
CAH
¢−1 dCAH
dΠAL
= 2RA
∂yA
∂ΠAL
>
0. Moreover, ∂
2WD
∂(ΠAL)
2 = − 2(RA)2
³
∂yA
∂ΠAL
´2
+ 2RA
∂2yA
∂(ΠAL)
2 < 0. So, as for other values
of ηD below bη, a donor for which ηD = 1 would like to delegate to an agent with
a mandate ηA∗ > ηD. QED.
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Table 1: % of Total Net Disbursements of ODA, 2001 
Country 
1.  
Bilateral 
ODA 
2.  
To NGOs  
3.  
To 
Multilateral 
Institutions 
4.  
Delegated aid 
(2+3) 
5.  
Non-
delegated aid 
(1-2) 
Australia 75.7 0.1 24.3 24.4 75.6 
Austria 64.1 0.3 35.9 36.2 63.8 
Belgium 57.9 0.6 42.1 42.7 57.3 
Canada 78.3 11.0 21.7 32.7 67.3 
Denmark 63.3 0.6 36.7 37.3 62.7 
Finland 57.7 1.1 42.3 43.4 56.6 
France 61.8 0.6 38.2 38.8 61.2 
Germany 57.2 . 42.8 . . 
Greece 40.9 . 59.1 . . 
Ireland 64.3 9.6 35.7 45.3 54.7 
Italy 27.2 5.2 72.8 78.0 22.0 
Japan 75.7 1.8 24.3 26.1 73.9 
Luxembourg 75.2 0.6 24.8 25.4 74.6 
Netherlands 70.1 9.8 29.9 39.7 60.3 
New Zealand 75.9 4.4 24.1 28.5 71.5 
Norway 69.9 . 30.1 . . 
Portugal 68.3 0.6 31.7 32.3 67.7 
Spain 66.2 0.3 33.8 34.2 65.8 
Sweden 72.3 5.1 27.7 32.8 67.2 
Switzerland 71.0 3.6 29.0 32.6 67.4 
UK 57.3 4.1 42.7 46.9 53.1 
USA 72.5 . 27.5 . . 
DAC Average 66.9 2.2 33.1 35.3 64.7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the DAC (2002). 
Note: . denotes missing information. 
 
 
Table 2: Order of Moves in Different Regimes 
Stage/Regime P D A 
1 Aid policy determined Not applicable Agent selected 
2 Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
3 Aid policy executed by 
donor 
Aid policy determined and 
executed by donor 
Aid policy determined and 
executed by agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: PL as a function of hD. 
 
 
Figure 2: yD as a function of PL. 
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